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Introduction 
The purposes of foreign policy-any foreign policy-are to protect 
and preserve a nation and its institutions and to further its goals. 
Today, in the case of the United States, this means guaranteeing 
our survival in a thermonuclear age and at the same time guarding 
us and our ideals against inroads by communism. 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that U.S. policy has been 
dangerously inadequate on both counts ever since World War 11. 
With the praiseworthy objective of promoting American security, 
U.S. policy has been devoted primarily to ways and means of 
"containing" the Soviet Union as well as Communist influence 
generally. And what has happened? During the past fifteen years 
the Soviet Union has steadily grown not only in economic and 
military power but also in world influence, while the area domi- 
nated by communism has expanded. At the same time, American 
policy has become wholly enmeshed in a nuclear arms race which, 
far from promoting our security, has within it the seeds of war and 
thus of destruction of our whole civilization. 
Never before in the history of mankind has so much been at 
stake in the relations between two nations as is at stake today in 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Never 
before, and - unless we are both wise and fortunate - perhaps 
never again. 
For the present sorry state of the world, Soviet policy must bear 
a large share of the blame. The U.S.S.R. has often been disruptive, 
obstructionist, and uncooperative to the point of paranoia. But it 
is not enough to condemn Soviet policy. It must be coped with. 
And a solicitous concern for the very objectives we seek to further 
makes it necessary to state that the responsibility for today's 
dangerous international situation must also be shared in no little 
degree by American policy. To the extent that our own policy is 
faulty, to the extent it has misread Soviet capabilities and inten- 
tions, to the extent it has failed to take advantage of possibilities 
for promoting both American security and peace, our duty as 
Americans is to seek to correct it. 
Since the end of the war, there has been no serious, thorough- 
going reevaluation of the basis of American foreign policy. The 
plea of this paper is that the very life of our nation-to say nothing 
of many other nations-depends on such a reevaluation, on a 
dispassionate restudy and rethinking in terms of the realities of 
the nuclear age. Particularly, this involves a fresh look at the 
Soviet Union. There has evolved an American image of the Soviet 
Union that is not only distorted but hardened beyond reason. 
Noting this, Professor Berman of the Harvard Law School points 
out that there are accurate, objective analyses of the U.S.S.R. but 
that "American readers . . . all too often simply reject, subcon- 
sciously, those images which conflict with their preconceptions." 
At official as well as unofficial levels, American attitudes toward 
the Communist Colossus have become befogged in a miasma of 
fear and emotion. It is imperative that they be clarified; not, 
indeed, with any thought of approval of the Soviet system or of 
communism generally, but because our continued misunderstand- 
ing of the Russians in fact serves the cause of communism rather 
than of freedom and at the same time fosters policies on both sides 
that increase the risk of nuclear war and mutual destruction. 
Our general policy toward the Soviet Union has been based on 
two major and unquestioned assumptions: first, the assumption 
of the constant and inevitable danger of Soviet military aggression: 
and, second, the assumption of the inevitability of American mili- 
tary superiority. In addition, there has been a third widely held 
assumption: that the Soviet system, that communism generally, 
could not succeed because it was evil. The first assumption led to 
the conclusion that negotiating with the Soviet Union on the basis 
1. Harold J. Berman, "The Devil and Soviet Russia," The Americun Scholar, 
Vol. XXVII ( Spring, 1958 ) , p. 148. 
of mutual compromise-which is the only basis for real negotia- 
tions-was useless or dangerous. The latter two assumptions led to 
the conclusion that negotiating was unnecessary and, in addition, 
possibly morally wrong. 
The Sptniki and Soviet ICBMs and rockets brought home to us 
that we had misread Soviet capabilities. There is reason now for 
serious consideration of the possibility that we have also misread 
Soviet intentions as far as military aggression is concerned. 
The case for reconsideration appears considerably strengthened 
by the fact that the Western and particularly the American record 
in judging the Soviet Union hardly warrants a refusal to reexamine 
our assumptions. We have been wrong on just about every major 
development in the U.S.S.R. since the Bolshevik revolution. We 
didn't anticipate the revolution; when it occurred, we didn't think 
it would succeed; when it was successful, we thought socialism 
was going to be abandoned; when it wasn't, we thought we 
wouldn't have to recognize the new Soviet state; when we did, we 
acted first as if it was like the Western democracies and then as if 
it was like the Nazis; when the Germans invaded, we thought the 
Russians could last only six weeks; when they survived the war, 
we thought they couldn't recover quickly from it; when they re- 
covered quickly, we thought they didn't have the know-how to 
build missiles, and so on. This record would seem to suggest, at 
least just a little bit, that perhaps we should not be too positive 
in other assumptions we have made. 
To suggest that the Soviet Union may not be necessarily mili- 
tarily aggressive is not at all to suggest that the Russians are or 
are likely to be either lovable or cooperative international part- 
ners. Pushed by fear, ignorance, and ideology, which often add up 
to false views of the world, the Russians are frequently not only 
churlish but also in intentional conflict with much of what we 
stand for at home and abroad. Their insistence on this conflict, 
partly in the hope of fostering communism throughout the world, 
is a type of aggression, but in and of itself it is not necessarily 
milita y aggression. 
What are the sources of Soviet conduct, and how have we mis- 
read them? To answer this it is necessary to understand two things 
about the U.S.S.R. First, it is a dual entity: a nation-state, with 
hopes and fears much like other nation-states, and at the same 
time it is the center of a world revolutionary movement. These two 
aspects of the Soviet Union have sometimes been in conflict, and 
when they have been, invariably Soviet national interest has tri- 
umphed over Soviet revolutionary interests. Second, Soviet Com- 
munists are impelled by-and limited by-ideological considera- 
tions to an extent that often eludes the more pragmatic West. 
No greater mistake could be made than to assume that the Com- 
munists do not believe deeply and sincerely in their basic ideology. 
Communist tactics are flexible, but the persistent adherence to 
what might be termed operational theory is unquestionable. 
Soviet Ideology 
There has been inadequate dispassionate study in the United 
States of Soviet Marxist theory. Despite much talk about it, there 
exists a wide misunderstanding about what it actually says. What 
the Bolsheviks under Lenin did was to take Marxism and adapt it 
to Russia and the world as they saw it. With certain modifications, 
this still forms the basis of their belief.2 
2. Of books on Soviet Marxist theory there is no end. For original Soviet 
sources, see V. I. Lenin, Marw, Engeh, MancisrrP, and Selected Works, 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947, 1950-52; J. Stalin, 
Problem of L e d n h ,  Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 
1947; see also R. N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of CommunkPm, 
Macmillan, New York, 1939, esp. pp. 70-83, 150-193; Alvin Z. Rubinstein 
( ed. ) , The Forefgn Poli y uf ths Soviet Union, Random House, New York, 
1960, esp. pp. 2-24,3446, 312326; Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: A 
Critical Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1958, Part I; 
Frederick L. Schuman, Russkr Since 1917, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 
1957, pp. 124-130; Mose L. Harvey, "The Basic Tactical and Strategic 
Concepts of Soviet Expansionism," in C. Grove Haines (ed. ), The Threat 
of Soufet Imperialism, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1955; Julian Tow- 
ster, Political Power in the U.S.S.R. 191 7-1 947, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1948, pp. 3-7, pp. 28-34; Robert V. Daniels ( ed . ) ,  A Docu- 
mentary Hbtory of Conmunim from Lenin to Mao, and Alfred G. Meyer, 
Cornmunimn, Random House, New York, 1980. 
The theory teaches that capitalism will fall of its own internal 
contradictions and that communism will ultimately pervade the 
whole world. The victory is seen coming country by country, 
through the revolutionary efforts of the respective Communist 
parties, possibly aided and abetted by the U.S.S.R. But the doc- 
trine holds that revolution as such is not exportable, that it must 
be generated initially from within when what Lenin called the 
"objective conditions" for revolution are present. 
Nowhere in the whole body of Soviet Marxist theory is there 
the implication that the Soviet Union, for ideological or any other 
reasons, should itself initiate a war. This does not mean, of course, 
that there are ideological barriers to the Soviet Union's euer initiat- 
ing a war, that it will not, under any conditions, utilize military 
force to promote its security, or that the Communists have especial 
devotion to peace as an ideal. Indeed, in former days, they talked 
of utilizing a war-started by somebody else-for furthering their 
goals. What is being said here is only that there is no ideological 
compulsion to military aggression. Soviet doctrine foresees com- 
munism coming to the world through other means than military 
conquest. 
Even this vision of a Communist world, however, does not 
embrace the goal of domination of the world by the Soviet Union 
as such. In Soviet theory, world communism has never been 
equated with a world under the rule of the U.S.S.R. In practice, 
extension of communism is likely to mean extension of Soviet 
influence, at least initially, and in some cases-as is true of the 
Eastern European satellites-Soviet domination. But at the same 
time the cases of Yugoslavia and China indicate that communism 
by itself does not necessarily mean Soviet domination. 
It is true that at one point Lenin saw armed conflict between 
communism and capitalism as inevitable and that he talked of 
using Soviet arms in the struggle. But it is necessary to recall that 
Lenin expressed these views during the Bolshevik revolution, at 
a time when the capitalist powers were actually invading Russia 
and when he naively believed that the fall of capitalism generally 
was right around the comer. Indeed, at that time the Bolsheviks 
by and large considered the revolution in Russia as important 
mainly because they saw it as the beginning of revolution every- 
where. On the other hand, the Comintern-the international or- 
ganization of the various Communist parties once described by 
Lenin as a "general staff for world revolution"-was formed during 
the capitalist invasion and initially served primarily as a device to 
strike at the enemies of the Soviet state by "fifth column" activities 
behind the lines. The Comintem was a failure in terms of promot- 
ing world revolution and quickly degenerated into an arm of 
Soviet foreign policy. 
Warlike quotations from Lenin and others, uttered during the 
revolutionary period, are still frequently cited-usually out of his- 
torical context-in an attempt to show the militarily aggressive 
nature of the Soviet UnionY3 but after the end of the civil war in 
Russia no such remarks have been made by any responsible 
Soviet leader. 
Not only that, but a series of false quotations attributed to Lenin 
and his cohorts have wide circulation in the United States, and 
even books based on them have been written. Many well-meaning 
citizens use them in all sincerity. Governor Rockefeller, for exam- 
ple, in an address to the New York Republican Club during the 
1980 presidential campaign, drew on this body of apocrypha to 
quote Lenin as saying: "Our immutable aim is, after all, world 
conquest." Another often-cited spurious quotation has Dimitry 
Manuilsky, one-time head of the Comintern, saying that the Com- 
munists will lull the capitalist countries with talk of peace and 
"as soon as their guard is down we shall smash them with our 
clenched fist." 
By 1921, Lenin had come to see that capitalist stability was a 
long-run phenomenon, and that it was necessary not only to get 
on with the building of the Soviet state but also to "coexist" with 
capitalism. In the meantime, however, the Soviet view of the world 
came to be based on the concept of the inevitability of capitalist 
3. For example, see Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1953, p. 285. 
4. See Abraham Brumberg, "Apropos of Quotation Mongering," The New 
Republic, August 29, 1960, pp. 15-16. Mr. Brumberg is executive editor of 
the State Department's bi-monthly Problems of Communism. 
hostility. This concept has remained the pivot of Soviet foreign 
policy. It is what makes the Russians probably even more sus- 
picious and fearful of us than we are of them. It does no good 
whatsoever to say or even to "prove" that such Soviet suspicions 
of us are wrong. They exist. They are imbedded deeply not only 
in Soviet ideology but also in the Russian past. This is the view 
they hold. It is ingrained in them. Moreover, they can cite instance 
after instance which, they feel, confirm their fears. One cannot 
hope to understand Soviet conduct in any meaningful fashion 
without consideration of these fears. 
Basis of Soviet Fears 
First there was the invasion of Russia and Siberia by the United 
States and other capitalist nations at the time of the Bolshevik 
revolution. The Russians have never forgotten it. This was followed 
first by Soviet exclusion from the Versailles Peace Conference, and 
then by the cordon sanitaire, with which Clemenceau hoped to 
protect the West "from the germs of Bolshevism in the East." The 
cordon sanitaire m-t non-recognition of the new Soviet state 
and establishment on its borders of nations with an anti-Soviet 
orientation." 
Excluded initially from the League of Nations, the Soviet Union 
perforce opposed the League's scheme of collective security and 
followed a policy of bilateral negotiations where it could. When 
the U.S.S.R. signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany, Western 
Europe's answer was the Treaty of Locarno, bringing Germany 
5. For a discussion of these matters, see George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves 
the War and The Decision to Intervene, Princeton University Press, Prince- 
ton, N. J., 1956, 1958; William A. Williams, American-Russian Relations, 
1781 -1 947, Rinehart and Company, New York, 1952; and Hugh Seton- 
Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, Cambridge University Press, 
London, 1945, pp. 362365. See also comments by John Maynard Keynes, 
The Economic Consequences of Peace, Harcourt, Brace and House, Ncw 
York, 1920, pp. 288-291. 
into the League and, it was hoped, into the West. Apprehensive 
of rising Nazi power, the Soviet Union joined the League in 1934 
(at the urging of France, which was also experiencing uneasiness 
over the Germans) and accepted a policy of collective security. 
Almost at this very moment, however, the French and the British 
were abandoning collective security for bilateral appeasement-of 
the Italians, of the Japanese, and of the Germans. The Munich 
conference, which excluded the U.S.S.R. despite its treaty rela- 
tions with both France and Czechoslovakia, gave the Nazis the 
green light to move eastward into Czechoslovakia. Rightly or 
wrongly, the Russians regarded it as an attempt to trap them. 
When, sidestepping the trap, they signed a treaty with the Nazis, 
they were denounced by the very people who had made an agree- 
ment with the Nazis at Munich. Meanwhile, the Russians were 
engaged in Far Eastern Siberia against Japanese aggression under 
circumstances that they felt indicated Western connivance." 
Certain it was that subsequent Soviet actions against Poland, 
against the Baltic States, and against the Finns were ruthless, but 
it is just as certain that, in the whole context of European plot and 
counter-plot of the times, these actions were explainable by mo- 
tives other than simply a desire to commit military aggression. 
It should also be clear, therefore, that no matter how unpalatable 
communism may be, it is a misreading of the Soviet Union to 
equate it with Nazi Germany. In addition to the deep ideological 
-and other-diff erences between communism and Nazism, com- 
munism can and does exist as a force independent of the Soviet 
Union, while Nazism existed only for aggrandizement of the 
German state. Moreover, the Nazi system was based-both the- 
oretically and practically-on unlimited military aggression and 
expansion of the Reich. While the Soviet Union certainly enlarged 
its territory as a result of the pact with Hitler, the essentially 
defensive nature of its policy stands out. Although Hitler proposed 
6. See Frederick L. Schuman, Swid Politics at Home and Abroad, Knopf, 
New York, 1946, Ch. VIII; Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 
Vols. I, 11, Oxford, New York, 1947; Harriet Moore, Souiet Far Eastern 
Policy, 1931-1945, Princeton, 1945; and Williams, op. cit., Chs. VII and 
VIII. 
grandiose plans for carving up the world, the U.S.S.R.'s response 
demonstrated that its interests were limited by security considera- 
tions and, in addition, were primarily centered in Eastern Europe.' 
Even considering capitalist hostility toward the Soviet Union, 
however, the Western reaction to the Soviet invasion of Finland- 
a country, it should be recalled, that had close ties with Nazi 
Germany and a strong anti-Soviet orientation-was astonishing. 
Already at war with Germany, despite little fighting, the French 
and British came within an ace of declaring war on the Soviet 
Union. The League of Nations, which had suffered less explicable 
aggressions by Italy, Japan, and Germany, then expelled the 
U.S.S.R. It was the only member of the League ever to be so 
treated. One does not have to accept all Soviet interpretations of 
this or other developments to understand how the Russians could 
see in them proof that their fears were well based.R 
The Cold War 
Against this background arose the almost wholly fortuitous coali- 
tion of the Anglo-American allies and the Soviet Union. At a time 
when they were fighting for their lives, the Russians were so sus- 
picious that they often inhibited well-meant Western efforts at 
assistance. That American aid and collaboration continued, and 
in increasing volume, made a deep impression on Stalin and his 
Kremlin cohorts. Of course Soviet goals did not change, but there 
is some evidence that our wholehearted collaboration made in- 
roads on their ideological conviction about the inevitability of 
7. See George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 191 7-1941, Van Nostrand, 
Princeton, N. J., 1960, pp. 102-114, and Schuman, op. cit., pp. 370-407. 
See also Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (eds. ), Nazi- 
Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, Didier, New York, 1948, pp. 217-259. For 
discussion of the Winter War against Finland, see Anatole G. Mazour, 
Finland Between East and West, Van Nostrand, 1956, esp. pp. 84-129. 
8. Cf. Schurnan, op. cit., p. 388-389. 
capitalist h~sti l i ty.~ But not enough. Hardly had the hot war 
ended when the cold war began. One factor was the over- 
optimistic American view of the Soviet Union. Fighting a war in 
the name of democracy, we suffered an unwarranted assumption 
that because we had an enemy in common with the U.S.S.R. we 
also had similar ideas about how the post-war world should be 
reorganized. In our eyes, of course, the cold war was caused by 
Soviet actions, of which a good many seemed calculated to offend 
and frighten the West. In the near-paranoia eyes of the Kremlin, 
however, the cold war was caused -by capitalist hostility. Again, 
it is by no means necessary to accept this-or any other-Soviet 
view. What is necessary is to understand that it exists. Let us look 
for a moment at the immediate post-war period as it seems to 
have appeared to the Russians. 
At each of the war-time conferences, the Russians were impor- 
tuned to enter the war against Japan, which they agreed to do 
three months after the war against the Nazis was over. They kept 
their agreement. Two days beforehand, however, the United States, 
with no prior consultation, dropped on Japan the atom bomb, the 
secret of which it had kept from its Soviet allies. The British 
physicist, P. M. S. Blackett, makes a strong case "that the dropping 
of the atomic bomb was not so much the last military act of the 
Second World War, as the first major operation of the cold diplo- 
matic war with Russia. . . ."lo One does not have to agree with 
9. A significant indication was the book by Prof. Evgeni Varga, Stalin's eco- 
nomic adviser. Written in 1945, before the onset of the cold war, the book 
takes the position that the United States did not behave like a typically 
capitalist country during the war, both because of its "coalition govern- 
ment" representing all classes and because of its policy toward the Soviet 
Union. When the book actually appeared in 1947, it was vigorously and 
officially denounced, but Varga did not recant. lzmeniia u Ekonornike Kap- 
italizrna v ltoge Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny (Changes in the Economy of Cap- 
italim in the Period of the Second World War), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 
1946. This volume received only slighting attention in the West and its 
implications for the theory of capitalist hostility have been almost com- 
pletely ignored. More tangible evidence was that the Russians were more 
cooperative after the war changed in their favor and Western friendship 
and aid was less vital to them. 
10. P.M.S. Blackett, Fear, War and the Bomb, Whittlesey House, New York, 
1948, esp. Ch. 10. 
Professor Blackett, however, to consider that if the situation had 
been reversed and if the Russians had developed and dropped an 
atom bomb without telling us, there would have been serious 
repercussions in the United States. Moreover, the United States 
then proposed to keep its monopoly of the atom bomb until such 
time as Moscow agreed to give up trying to make one and mean- 
while submitted to international inspection. While the Baruch 
Plan may have appeared to Americans as a magnanimous offer to 
give up its atom bomb monopoly, the Russians considered it a 
scheme to enforce a "freeze* on their inferiority in atomic power.ll 
To the Soviet Union, Western fears of Soviet military aggression 
right after the end of the war must have appeared ridiculous as 
well as insincere. Although the U.S.S.R. came out of the war with 
its armies extended into Eastern and Central Europe as well as 
Far Eastern Asia, it was weak. The destruction wrought by the 
conflict in both human and material terms was indescribable. The 
Soviet people, without adequate food, shelter, or clothing, were 
exhausted physically and psychologically. While it is true that the 
Soviet army was large numerically, much of it was still unmech- 
anized and intently preoccupied in Germany and Eastern Europe. 
Its air force was inadequate. Except for a few submarines, it had 
virtually no navy. 
As against this situation, the United States ended the war with 
its war-making potential not only undamaged but greater than 
ever before. It is often implied that the American demobilization 
right after the war substantially lessened our comparative mili- 
tary strength. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Amer- 
ican air force controlled the skies. The American navy controlled 
the seas. American bases, together with those of our British ally, 
were firmly ensconced around much of the great periphery of the 
Soviet Union. And the United States, and it alone, possessed the 
atom bomb. 
The Russians felt an understandable pride in their successes 
in the war and were determined to play a role in the world com- 
11. Zbid., Chs. 11-13, and V. M. Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1948, esp. pp. 257-316. 
mensurate with the price they had paid for victory. This meant 
a foreign policy that was, from the Kremlin's point of view, essen- 
tially defensive, although with a chip-on-shoulder attitude 
scarcely designed to win friends. On the other hand, it was 
not clear to the Kremlin just how much friendship was being 
offered. There had been the atom bomb. Further, during the 
war-time negotiations hopes had been held out for American 
assistance for Soviet reconstruction. But once the European war 
ended, American lend-lease aid stopped. A Soviet request for a 
large loan somehow "got lost" in the labyrinths of the State De- 
partment. Wartime promises regarding matters vital to Moscow- 
like revision of the Montreux Convention governing the Darda- 
nelles-somehow proved illusory. Had the Soviet Union reacted 
differently from the way it did, it is possible, of course, that some 
or even all of these matters would have worked themselves out. 
But it should be emphasized that the Russians are not a Western 
European people, and that their reactions-from Ivan the Terrible 
to Stalin the Terrible and after-have often been considered offen- 
sive by many reared in the more gentle and sophisticated culture 
of the West. Moreover, Soviet policy now for the first time em- 
braced within its defense perimeter territory outside Soviet bor- 
ders, i.e., Eastern Europe. 
Eastern Europe 
During the whole period between the wars, the Soviet Union, 
because of its own preoccupation and weakness, action by the 
Versailles Powers, and other factors, was virtually excluded from 
the arena of international politics. If one assumes that all large 
states have certain "core interests" - areas outside but usually 
adjacent to their borders which they view as vital to their security 
-this exclusion was unnatural. The West may have come to 
accept their cordon sanituire as natural, but the Russians did not. 
Particduly was this true of Eastern Europe, an area of traditional 
Russian concern. To say that this was viewed with disfavor by the 
Kremlin is to put it lightly, and by the time of Munich, at least, a 
change in conditions in Eastern Europe became an important goal 
of Soviet foreign policy. What happened, of course, was that, as a 
result of pushing back the Nazi armies during the war, Soviet 
troops occupied most of Eastern Europe and then installed their 
Communist-dominated regimes subservient to Moscow. Hence- 
forth maintenance of hegemony of some sort became the cardinal 
point in Soviet foreign policy. Since Eastern Europe was now a 
Soviet core interest, it was not a subject for negotiation any more 
than, say, the Panama Canal Zone or the Monroe Doctrine would 
be considered as subjects for negotiation by the United States. 
Yet it was precisely this Soviet domination of Eastern Europe 
which the West challenged, as early as the fall of 1945, and it was 
the political conflict over Eastern Europe that constituted the 
opening gambit of what we came to call the cold war. 
The politics of Eastern Europe are complex and far removed 
from Western tradition. Historically, Eastern Europe is not an 
area where Westem-type political democracy was practiced or 
understood, except for Czechoslovakia. That Soviet domination 
was harsh and often cruel and contrary to our moral standards is 
beyond question. But if the West considered Soviet actions in 
Eastern Europe as a violation of wartime promises, it must be 
pointed out that the Russians considered the Western challenge 
to their position also as a violation of wartime promises. We do 
not have to accept this position to understand it. A reasonable 
case can be made, however, for saying that the Russians gave 
as much as they got at Yalta and that the agreement concluded 
there in 1945 was so ambiguous and contradictory as to make its 
fuEllment by both sides virtually impossible.12 In any event, the 
.2. Domestic political propaganda in connection with the Yalta agreement has 
befogged public understanding of the complex situation in Eastern Europe 
as of the war's end. For a good brief description of the facts, see Robert Lee 
Wow, The Balkans in Our Time, Harvard, 1956, pp. 248-267. See also 
John Snell (ed.), The Meaning of Yalta, Louisiana State University Press, 
Baton Rouge, La., 1956; Hugh Seton-Watson, The Eastern European Reu- 
olution, Praeger, New York, 1950, p. 165-166; and Schurnan, op. dt., pp. 
503-529. 
Russians were in Eastern Europe primarily not through any 
acquiescence on our part but as a result of their military position, 
and they were determined to remain there. Nothing could have 
been done to prevent it, short of another war then and there. It is as 
inaccurate to say that we "gave" Eastern Europe to the Soviet 
Union as it is to say that the Soviets "destroyed" democracy there. 
We could not give what we did not have, and the Soviets could 
not destroy what did not exist. 
When Americans talk today about "Soviet aggression," they are 
likely to have in mind Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. In one 
sense these actions did constitute a type of aggression. But one 
does not have to approve of what the Russians did to see that it 
was not physical, military aggression, in the sense of one state 
simply initiating a war against another for the purpose of terri- 
torial aggrandizement. This point has been overshadowed by our 
emotional opposition to the Soviet Union. A case in point is 
Czechoslovakia. 
Time and time again, the Communist coup &?tat of February, 
1948, in Czechoslovakia has been cited as evidence of Soviet mili- 
tary aggression. Yet the facts are that there were no Soviet troops 
in Czechoslovakia at the time of the Communist take-over. The 
coup dktat was managed by the Czech Communists themselves, 
who constituted the largest political party and parliamentary 
group as a result of the free election of 1946. There is no doubt 
that the U.S.S.R. spurred them on and gave them advice. It is 
true that local political arrangements begun by the Red Army 
during its comparatively brief occupation of Slovakia and part 
of the Czech provinces toward the end of the war helped lay 
the groundwork for the Communists' success. There were, of 
course, Soviet troops on the Eastern borders of Czechoslovakia, 
as there were American troops on the Western borders. But 
perhaps more important than any of these factors in the success 
of communism in Czechoslovakia was the traumatic experience 
of Munich. To many non-Communist Czechs - who may since 
have changed their minds - a 5 i t y  with the Soviet Union was 
simply preferable to affinity with the West. The bitter fruit of 
pre-war anti-Soviet policies was being reaped. That a nation with 
the fine democratic past and democratic possibilities of Czacbo- 
slovakia fell to communism is deplorable. But whatever it showed, 
it did not show evidence of Soviet military aggression.lJ 
Stalin's Foreign Policy 
The fact is that Stalin's foreign policy was in his view not only 
defensive but also non-expansive, except for the security zone of 
Eastern Europe. This policy was, of course, primarily tactical. 
Having adopted Lenin's view of long-run capitalist stability, Stalin 
believed firmly that revolutions had little chance for success any- 
where unless, as in Eastern Europe, they were installed under 
Soviet aegis." As a result, Stalin not only did not further Com- 
munist activities in many areas but actually opposed them. The 
reason was not that Stalin was "nice" or "moral," but that he con- 
sidered them unlikely to succeed and harmful to Soviet interest 
as he saw it at the time. This is widely misunderstood in the West. 
For instance, the main assumption of the Truman Doctrine was 
that the Soviet Union was aiding and abetting if not actually di- 
recting a Communist revolution in Greece so as to extend its 
domination to that country. The facts seem to be that Stalin not 
only did not aid the Greek Communists but had indicated his 
13. See inter a h  Seton-Watson, op. dt., pp. 179-190; H. Gordon Skilling, 
"The Break-Up of the Czechoslovak Coalition, 1947-8," The C a d k n  
Journal of ~c~nomics  and Politid Science, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (August, 
1960), pp. 396-412; "The Prague Overturn in 1948," C a d f u n  Slavonic 
Papers, 1960, pp. 88-114; and Josef Korbel, The Cornmudat Subversion of 
Czechoslouakia, 1938-1 948, Princeton, 1959. 
14. Czechoslovakia was, to some extent, an exception. Stalin's moral support 
of the coup &&at there appears to be explainable by the strategic location 
of the country in the Soviet security zone, the already powerful position of 
the Czech Communists, and fears that Marshall Plan enticements might 
bring a Western orientation. The Czech Communists, of course, themselves 
wanted to come to power, regardless of how Moscow felt, and it was they 
alone who brought it off. 
opposition to their revolution. Similarly, the evidence is that he 
advised Mao Tse-tung against proceeding with the revolution in 
China and refrained from assisting the Chinese Communists until, 
as a result of their own efforts, they were successful. And although 
he tried to dominate Communist Yugoslavia by other means, when 
the break with Tito came in 1948 Stalin's response was not military 
intervention but, together with economic sanctions, the ideological 
punishment of expulsion from the Cominfonn.15 
Even the three instances where Soviet policy utilized force in 
one way or another during this early post-war period illustrated 
the cautious nature of Stalin's policy. These instances involved 
areas-Iran, Berlin, and Korea-where Soviet and American armed 
forces confronted each other at the end of the war and where the 
lines of demarcation were sources of political conflict. In Iran, 
although the Russians tried to create political conditions in their 
wartime occupation zone favorable to them, they did withdraw, 
even if reluctantly, with the job unaccomplished. The Berlin 
blockade was a maneuver in the cold war game being played by 
both sides in Germany. However unwarrantedly, Moscow saw it 
as a parry to our thrust. Stalin was outmaneuvered, but his very 
backing down illustrated his caution. 
The origins of the Korean war are complicated and unclear. 
The invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans could hardly 
have taken place without Soviet approval if not Soviet initiative. 
But to say that this invasion was an act of military aggression does 
not lessen its defensive overtones. The strategic importance of 
Korea to the U.S.S.R. is obvious and historic. In Soviet eyes, the 
Americans had improperly tried to utilize the United Nations to 
unify Korea on their terms. From Seoul, Syngman Rhee had sev- 
eral times reiterated his intention of achieving Korean unity by 
force if need be, and it was by no means clear to Moscow, espe- 
15. Our best information on these points comes from the Yugmh.  See espe- 
cially Vladimir Dedijer, Tito, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1953, pp. 
321322 ff. See also Fred Warner Neal, "Moral Responsibility for World 
Leadership," Western PoWal  Quarterly, December, 1956, and TitokPm 
in Action; the R e f m  in Yugoskruta, University of California Press, Berke- 
ley, 1958, esp. Chs. I, 11, XI; and Rubinstein, op. cit., pp. 211 ff. 
cially after John Foster Dulles's visit to South Korea just before 
the outbreak of hostilities, that the United States would not aid 
and abet this objective. That the Russians, to say nothing of the 
North Korean Communists-interested as both of them were in 
preventing this at all costs-felt two could play at the game of 
forced unity is not altogether surprising. If the Korean war indi- 
cated other than a purely defensive policy, it also illustrated again 
Stalin's willingness to let communism suffer defeat-or at least fall 
short of victory-rather than involve the Soviet Union itself in 
war.16 
Although it came after Stalin, mention should be made here 
of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 to put down a revolution. 
This was, certainly, physical military aggression. It was a brutal 
action, reprehensible in the eyes of most of the non-Communist 
world. Yef even this action must be distinguished from the type 
of military aggression that the West apparently fears and that 
it accuses the U.S.S.R. of being ever ready to commit. The fear in 
the West is of aggression to expond the area of Soviet power. The 
Soviet aggression in Hungary, on the other hand, was aggression 
to maintain a position previously achieved and in an area that the 
Kremlin considers its most important core of interest. To make 
this distinction in no way condones the Soviet repression in Hun- 
gary, but it is a necessary distinction to make if one wishes 
accurately to assess Soviet intention on the basis of past perform- 
ance. 
None of this is intended to justify Soviet actions. Any "defense" 
of the Soviet Union is incidental to the main purpose of assessing 
Soviet policy accurately so as to be able to cope with it better. 
To characterize Stalin's foreign policy as defensive is by no means 
to say that it was conciliatory or that it sought to promote good 
relations with the West. Indeed, often the contrary was hue. The 
defensive character of Soviet policy in this period implied no less- 
ening of Soviet hostility toward capitalism or weakening of Soviet 
desires for the spread of communism. What is being said here is 
simply that Soviet policy has not demonstrated a propensity for 
-- 
16. Cf. Rubinstein, op. dt., pp. 250-!53. 
mditay aggression and that the evidence usually cited to justify 
the contention that the Soviet Union is militarily aggressive is 
without foundation. 
The Failure of American Policy 
The real failure of American policy was that it was based on the 
assumption that there was a constant and overriding danger of 
Soviet military aggression when in fact there was not. As long as 
we maintained unquestioned military superiority over the Rus- 
sians, this assumption did not have to be tested. It could always 
be said that the Soviet Union refrained from aggression because 
of our superior military strength. (In fact, this was said at the 
same time that the U.S.S.R. was accused of not having refrained 
from aggression.) Thus seemingly secure, we relied more and 
more on a military posture, exclusive of much else. This would 
have been bad enough had the United States in fact been able to 
maintain its military superiority. For one thing, precious years 
were lost in formulating adequate policies to deal with the realities 
of the social revolution which gripped-and still grips-much of the 
post-war world. Unfortunately, while our policies were oriented 
to defense against a danger that was not there, Soviet power bur- 
geoned at home and Communist influence-like the Monitor in its 
battle with the Merrirnac-sailed on largely uninhibited by our 
guns. 
When, suddenly, our misreading of Soviet capabilities became 
apparent and we realized that we no longer had military superi- 
ority over the Russians, the tragic results of these policies loomed 
large. We found ourselves in a nuclear arms race that could not 
be won, while the problem of nuclear weapons control had become 
incredibly more difficult. At the same time, the political issues that 
went unresolved while we concentrated on the danger of Soviet 
military aggression were now thornier than ever and constituted 
growing irritations capable of triggering a nuclear holocaust. 
On some Americans this made an impression. The altered situa- 
tion was one of the factors, for instance, causing George F. Kennan 
to abandon the policy of containment he had earlier championed 
and, indeed, helped to formulate. His Reith lectures over the BBC 
in the spring of 1958 were devastatingly critical of U.S. policy and 
especially of our views of the Soviet Union.'? But American 
thinking generally and American policy did not change. 
The matter of Germany is a good illustration of the problem. 
Because we were afraid of Soviet military aggression we had pro- 
moted German rearmament and integration with the West. There 
never were-and still have not been-any real negotiations with 
the Soviet Union on German reunification. It may well be that 
the Russians never, under any conditions, would have agreed to a 
plan for unification which we could have accepted. But they made 
it very clear that the one plan for unification they would not 
accept was one that permitted a reunified and rearmed Germany 
to become a part of NATO. Since we constantly insisted that any 
reunification be of just that kind, we in effect never tested the 
Soviet willingness to agree to any other kind. In the words of 
George Kennan, "Until we stop pushing the Kremlin against a 
closed door, we shall never learn whether it would be prepared to 
go through an open door." l8 
Meanwhile, our whole European policy has become oriented to 
West Germany, which is now our most powerful partner. The 
Bonn government has been pursuing a policy of its own, and it is 
by no means clear that this policy does not seek to impede rather 
than promote a meaningful European settlement. Bonn's attitudes 
toward East Germany, toward Berlin, and toward the Oder-Neisse 
Line are cases in point. But the United States has lost the power 
of initiative so far as Germany is concerned. Even if we did not 
agree with West Germany on these issues, we could not take an 
independent stand as long as we feel we "need" West Germany. 
17. The lectures were published under the title Rush, the Atom and the West, 
Harper & Brothers, New York, 1958. Compare with Kennan's initial state- 
ment of the containment policy, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign 
Afairs, Vol. XXV (1947), pp. 566-582. 
18. Russia, the Atom and the West, p. 41. 
And that feeling is based on the assumption that a strong NATO 
is necessary to protect Western Europe against Soviet military 
aggression. Incidentally, in stressing the urgency of making NATO 
strong, the 1961 communiques read much like those of 1951.19 If 
NATO strength is really needed to prevent a Soviet attack on 
Western Europe and such strength has not yet been attained after 
ten years of effort, one might well ask what the Russians are 
waiting for. 
There is no question that the major issue at stake in our rela- 
tions with the Russians involves the nuclear arms race. But that is 
not the only one. In some ways almost as important is the issue of 
expanding communism and Soviet influence, primarily in the un- 
derdeveloped areas. That this is not primarily a military issue 
makes it, in the long run, little less significant. The underdeveloped 
parts of the world constitute the bulk of the world's area and 
population, and it is not too difficult to imagine a future world in 
which they will wield great power. To some extent this is already 
apparent in the United Nations. 
The collapse of Western European colonial power as a result 
of the war set off revolutionary currents throughout these under- 
developed areas. The United States was inclined to place the 
blame on the Soviet Union, especially where neutralist and social- 
ist-oriented regimes resulted. We failed to understand that while 
communism as a revolutionary force and the Soviet Union as a 
state may be closely related, they are not the same thing. Our 
firm assumption of the aggressive and expansive nature of Soviet 
policy blinded us to the reality that even where the Communists 
participated, these revolutionary movements were for the most 
part indigenously originated and motivated mainly by the desire 
for national independence and internal change. The result was 
that the United States needlessly dissipated large quantities of 
its "reservoir of good will," ultimately to the advantage of the 
Communists, and that still we are more often in a position of ap- 
pearing to oppose rather than to support the new nations. The 
19. So do statements of the respective Secretaries of State involved. About 
all that is needed is to change the name "Acheson" to "Rusk." 
result was also that the United States got itself in a position of 
backing questionable regimes-questionable not so much because 
they are sometimes '%ad," by our own standards, as because they 
tend to lack necessary support from their own peoples. In the case 
of colonial regimes, it was, again, our assumptions about Soviet 
military aggression that stood in the way of realistic action. We 
often felt we could not afford to support anti-colonial movements 
because this would alienate our allies, whose collaboration we 
considered necessary to help defend Western Europe against 
Soviet attack. 
Ironically, up until the last days of Stalin, the Soviet Union- 
isolationist as well as defensive-paid little attention to the under- 
developed areas. The U.S.S.R. all but ignored anti-colonial move- 
ments and reacted to "neutralism" with almost as much suspicion 
and hostility as the United States. This, as we now know well, is 
no longer the case. 
Soviet Policy Takes the Offensive 
What happened was that in 1952 Soviet foreign policy, still under 
Stalin, underwent a great change. It shifted from the defensive to 
the offensive. At the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, Stalin proclaimed an end to the long period of 
capitalist stability, to the "ebb tide of revolution," and announced 
that a "flow tide" had set in. As a result, he called for an aban- 
donment of the essentially defensive policy that had been followed 
ever since 1921, and particularly since 1945, and the beginning of 
a foreign policy offensive-an aggressive policy, if you please, 
although not militarily aggress i~e .~~  
The evidence of the changed situation in the world, according 
to Stalin, was not only the economic and military recovery of the 
20. For Stalin's views, see account of 19th Congress in Leo Gruliow (ed.), 
Current Soviet Policies, Praeger, New York, 1953. 
Soviet Union, or even the consolidation of communism in Eastern 
Europe and China, but also revolutionary developments in most 
of the rest of the world, particularly in the underdeveloped 
areas. 
Nationalism, said Stalin, was now the dominant factor in the 
world, and this was being ignored by the capitalist states, espe- 
cially by the United States with its multi-national and supra- 
national anti-Communist devices. It was, therefore, up to the 
Communists to exploit this by picking "up the banner of national- 
ism where it had been dropped by the bourgeoisie." To do this, 
he said, would both promote Soviet security (by breaking up 
NATO and other American-led military alliances) and hasten the 
collapse of capitalism in general. Stalin advised the Communists 
to return to the concept of the popular front, soft-pedal extremist 
ideas, collaborate with the Socialists, and fight against colonialism 
and for revolution. In the general process, Stalin promised, the 
Soviet Union would help weaken capitalism by economic com- 
petition and help win over the underdeveloped areas by economic 
aid. 
Although Stalin conceived his new offensive in non-military 
terms, he predicted war-not, he said, between capitalism and 
communism but among the capitalist countries. In making this 
prediction, Stalin returned to the Marxist theory of war, that war 
was an 44inevitable" concomitant of capitalism. 
This Marxist theory of war was always the weak link in another 
Soviet theory, the theory of peaceful coexistence as conceived by 
Lenin and maintained by Stalin. Coexistence, in Soviet theory, 
always had a distinctly illusive and impermanent character. Not 
only was it conceived as temporary because of the anticipated 
inevitable fall of capitalism, but it was futile to talk of long-run 
peace because of the inevitability of war. Given, at the same time, 
the theory of the inevitability of capitalist hostility, this meant 
that there was not only the constant danger but indeed the likeli- 
hood that capitalist war would also involve the Soviet Union. 
Under such conditions one might coexist temporarily with the 
capitalist nations, and even make agreements with them, but 
neither coexistence nor agreements were likely to be of long-term 
duration, and genuinely friendly relations on a basis of trust were, 
in any case, out of the question. Stalin in 1952 called for "peace 
tactics" both because he considered this to be popular and thus 
an aid to the new foreign policy offensive and because he thought 
such tactics "might prevent a particular war." But it was clear 
he considered "peace tactics" just that and incapable of prevent- 
ing war over any long-run period. 
Stalin died before there could be much implementation of the 
new foreign policy offensive. Yet the line he laid down at the 19th 
Party Congress in 1952 began to be carried out almost at once by 
his successors. In the meantime, however, there came an extremely 
important development-perhaps the most important development 
in mankind's history: the hydrogen bomb. Stalin, because he was 
either whistling in the dark or ignorant, discounted the importance 
of the atom bomb even after the Soviet Union acquired it. But 
soon after his death the Soviet Union-no less than the United 
States-developed the hydrogen bomb. Not surprisingly, the ap- 
pearance of this instrument of Armageddon produced some serious 
rethinking in the Kremlin about the implications of the new policy 
in relation to the theory of coexistence. 
The year 1955 was filled with Soviet expressions of concern 
about the H-bomb. There was something of a public debate in the 
U.S.S.R. about whether it was capable of destroying "all civiliza- 
tion," "only capitalism," or '10th capitalism and socialism." The 
most recent as well as the most explicit statement came in October, 
1960, from a Soviet General Staff expert, General Nikolai A. Talen- 
sky. In the event of thermonuclear war, General Talensky wrote, 
"not a single country would escape the ensuing crushing, devas- 
tating blows. . . . The world population would be reduced by one 
half. . . . Moreover, the most active, capable, and civilized portion 
would be wiped out. One should also remember that the material 
and technological basis for life would be destroyed." An aggressor 
could not hope to survive, even in the event of a surprise attack, 
General Talensky declared. And he concluded that it was "impos- 
21. See, for instance, Praoda, Jan. 10, March 5, April 11, June 1, and Oct. 9, 
1955. 
sible now to use weapons for the solution of political tasks as has 
been the case in the course of thousands of years."22 
The fact was that the Soviet Communists realized that they 
were now faced for the first time with something that was unlikely 
to respond to the dialectic, something that threatened them and 
all Communist development no matter what they did. They were 
also in an ideological dilemma. They had clung to the Marxist 
theory that war was inevitable as long as capitalism existed. Capi- 
talism did exist. Therefore there would be war. But war with 
H-bombs would, or at least might, destroy everything, themselves 
included. The theory was thus one of inevitable doom. Not only 
was it an ideological cul-de-sac, but it was hardly a fitting theory 
for the exponents of the Brave New Proletarian World. 
A New Theory of Coexistence 
The result of these Soviet considerations was a new theoretical 
position, proclaimed by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress 
in 1956, which had enormous significance for Soviet policy and, 
in particular, for American-Soviet relations. What Khrushchev 
did was to reverse both Stalin and Marx and declare that capitalism 
no longer meant the inevitability of war. The main reason he 
gave was that even though capitalism meant the continuing 
danger of war the "peace-loving, Socialist forces" in the world 
were now so strong that they had a chance to prevent it. But he 
was also, it is known, motivated by the dangers of the H-bomb 
to the Soviet Union. Regardless of his reasons, what mattered was 
the new ideological position: war was no longer ine~itable.?~ 
22. N. Talensky, "On the Character of Modem Warfare," Znternationul 
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This meant above all two things: 
First, peaceful coexistence no longer had to be only temporary. 
The theoretical inhibitions that prevented the Soviet Union from 
thinking of long-term peaceful relations with capitalist powers 
had been removed. 
Second, it meant a new interpretation of the concept of capi- 
talist hostility. The capitalist powers might continue to think 
of coexistence as only temporary-that is, as a prelude to a 
military conftict which they themselves would initiate. But it 
was no longer out of the question-as it was formerly-for the 
Soviet Union to pursue policies calculated to make the cap- 
italists change their concept of coexistence as the Soviet leaders 
had changed theirs. Indeed, since the Soviet's new foreign policy 
offensive was to be carried forward and might increase inter- 
national tensions, it was, in fact, imperative for the U.S.S.R. to 
work out arrangements to make sure that military conflict could 
be avoided. 
The importance of this new Soviet theory cannot be exaggerated. 
The strength of the Soviet commitment to it was underscored at 
the 21st Party Congress in 1959, when Khrushchev announced a 
still further ideological break-through: the approach to commu- 
nism. Traditional Marxist theory sees the achievement of commu- 
nism in three stages following seizure of power-first, the "dicta- 
torship of the proletariat"; second, "socialism," with political equal- 
ity under the proletarian state and citizens rewarded in accordance 
with their work; and, finally, "communism" itself, with the state 
"withering away," economic plenty, and citizens rewarded ac- 
cording not to their work but to their needs. Stalin had proclaimed 
the socialist stage in the Soviet Union in 1936. The Communist 
stage-a sort of "pie in the sky by-and-by"-was always in the 
unforeseeable future. Furthermore, visions of communism had 
always seen it only on a world-wide basis. 
In 1959, however, Khrushchev declared that the U.S.S.R.-alone 
-was on the verge of entering the Communist stage: a sort of 
"communism in one country." Communist economic plenty, he 
indicated, would be no consumer's cornucopia in the American 
fashion but simply satisfaction of essential consumer needs by 
Soviet standards?' To prove that he really meant it, Khrushchev 
literally inundated the Soviet Union with propaganda commit- 
ments to overtake U.S. production in certain key items. 
Such promises of limited economic plenty in the U.S.S.R.- 
whether American production is actually equalled by 1970 or not- 
is within the realm of possibility, but only on one condition. The 
condition is that substantially fewer resources than at present be 
devoted to military  purpose^?^ But given the present state of the 
world, with hostile capitalist countries and H-bombs seen lurking 
behind every launching pad, a major curtailment of resources 
devoted to defense cannot be risked unless there is at least some 
measure of disarmament. Deterrence is no less important from the 
Soviet point of view than from ours. Disarmament clearly is not 
possible without agreement with capitalist countries. And mean- 
ingful agreements with capitalist countries are not possible unless 
Soviet policy is couched in terms of indefinite peaceful coexistence. 
In the Soviet view capitalism will, of course, fall anyway sooner 
or later, and in the meantime the U.S.S.R. can work in a non-mili- 
tary way to hasten its demise. 
Thus there emerged a new concept of coexistence. What was, 
in one sense, only a temporary tactic for Lenin and Stalin has 
become for Khrushchev a basic, strategic doctrine, necessary in the 
interest of the Soviet Union both as a state and as the center of a 
world revolutionary movement. 
All this does not necessarily mean that all Soviet proposals for 
disarmament are meaningful and not propaganda. The Kremlin 
is still playing the game initiated by Stalin of trying to break down 
American military alliances and win support of the uncommitted 
countries. But it does indicate that all Soviet proposals for disarma- 
ment are not necessarily propaganda and that there is little doubt 
24. See Pruudu, Jan. 28, 1959. Translation of Khrushchev's declaration is 
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about the earnestness and sincerity of the Soviet desire to limit and 
control arms production and to eliminate thermonuclear weapons 
and the deadly dangers for everybody that their existence creates. 
The Limits of Soviet Compromise 
Although this attitude presumably s i g d e s  a wider area of pos- 
sible compromise on the part of the U.S.S.R., there are still at least 
three irreducible minima in Soviet policy where to the Soviets 
compromise is out of the question, and it is important for Ameri- 
cans to understand them. 
First, the new Soviet position means no abandonment of Soviet 
efforts to further communism by non-military means, especially in 
the underdeveloped areas. As long as the Soviet Union remains 
the center of the Communist movement, there is no possibility that 
it will abandon its posture of ideological opposition to capitalism 
or fail to work for communism. 
Walter Lippmann has understood Khrushchev to say that the 
new version of coexistence means that while the Soviet Union may 
work to bring about communism in underdeveloped areas, the West 
can do nothing about it.26 In one way this is correct. Western ac- 
ceptance of the Soviet view of coexistence would mean no military 
intervention in the event of revolution. But similarly it means no 
Soviet military intervention. And, meanwhile, there is nothing in 
the concept to indicate that the West cannot work against the 
development of communism by other means. Furthermore, there 
is at least implied the possibility of Soviet abstention in certain 
areas of Western core interest, provided, of course, that the West 
abstains from interference in areas of Soviet core interest. Partic- 
ularly, of course, the new Soviet position does not mean no inter- 
vention in cases where the United States has already intervened. 
26. Walter Lippmann, The Communist W& and Ours, Little, Brown, Boston, 
1959, pp. 12-13. 
This was roughly the situation in Laos where in 1960 the neutralist 
government of Prince Souvanna Phouma was overthrown by forces 
actively assisted by the United States.27 Soviet assistance to Com- 
munist and other forces opposed to the successor government was 
thus a response to American initiative. Of course, as in the case 
of Laos, where the government we helped overthrow was not a 
Communist government, "communism" in any narrow sense is by 
no means always the issue. In Laos the Communists were actively 
involved in the opposition to the pro-Western government and 
presumably even dominated it. As far as is known, however, 
Soviet aid was not accompanied by Soviet personnel, and it is by 
no means certain that the Russians were able to dictate to the 
rebel forces regarding details of a cease fire, etc. Relations between 
Soviet policy and Chinese policy in Laos may have been a factor, 
but they are not clear. It is, in fact, entirely possible that Soviet 
intervention in Laos was a restraining rather than an aggravating 
influence. 
Secondly, the Soviet Union will under no conditions niake any 
agreements or take any steps deleterious to its hegemony in East- 
ern Europe or cease to object violently to any indication of 
interference in this area. On perhaps no other single point is the 
U.S.S.R. as sensitive. As long as the Soviet Union remains a nation- 
state, it will see Eastern Europe as a core interest, and core interests 
are, by definition, non-negotiable. The earnestness of Moscow's 
intentions here was indicated by Soviet willingness to jeopardize 
much of the propaganda value of its new foreign policy approach 
by putting down the Hungarian revolution with force. Despite the 
importance placed on appearing as peaceful and wooing the Social 
Democratic parties, the Yugoslavs, and the other neutral nations, 
there was little hesitation in choosing between these objectives 
and crushing potentially hostile forces in a key Eastern European 
nation. 
Finally, the Soviet Union will not give up or jeopardize its dic- 
tatorship at home and permit the degree of freedom enjoyed in 
27. The New York Times chronicled the American military build-up in Laos, 
but this was largely forgotten in the 1961 crisis. See issue of the Times 
for Jan. 9, 1961, p. 13, for a good report on U.S. intervention. 
many places in the West. This point has particular relevance in 
connection with nuclear weapon agreements. The U.S.S.R. tends 
to look askance at proposals for complete and unfettered inspec- 
tion by foreigners. There are two main reasons for this. First, the 
Kremlin certainly fears that unlimited inspection might endanger 
its closed system and expose examples of both backwardness and 
political repression which it prefers to keep hidden. Second, 
inspection runs hard against their ingrained feeling of hostility 
toward capitalism which, despite possible new interpretations, 
continues to color Moscow's policies. Regardless of what the West 
does, the first impediment is not likely to be removed for some 
time. On the other hand, the Russians have indicated that a 
Western commitment to total disarmament would overcome the 
second impediment, and that in that case the first one would not 
be a barrier either.28 The point is that the Soviet Union thinks 
it has valid reasons for a reluctance to accept unlimited in- 
spection. It is important to note that these reasons have 
nothing to do with any intention to violate an official testing or 
disarmament agreement.lQ This does not mean that any given 
Soviet position on inspection-for instance, the troika or unani- 
mous agreement idea-might not be changed. But it does 
suggest that there is no necessary contradiction between the 
U.S.S.R.'s professed desire for disarmament agreements and its 
reticence about inspection. 
Regardless of what we may think about these Soviet irreduc- 
ibles, almost certainly they are irreducibles and will remain so for 
the foreseeable future. It is difficult to see how anything the West 
can do could alter them. Is not the West faced, therefore, with 
the choice between accepting these conditions and rejecting en- 
tirely the new Soviet view of coexistence? 
28. See Khrushchev statement in New York Times, Sept. 27, 1960, p. 1, and 
disarmament proposal to Geneva conference by Semyon Tsarapkin, the 
Soviet delegate, Los Angeles Times, June 30, 1961, p. 1. 
29. John Scott, assistant to the publisher of Time, a man of long experience 
and considerable expertise in Soviet affairs, is among those holding the 
same opinion. See his editorial in the Ridgefield, Conn., Press, March 
17, 1960. 
The U. S. Response t o  Coexistence 
We now come to the situation in the spring of 1960. There is little 
doubt that Khrushchev saw in the post-Dulles American foreign 
policy and in his relations with President Eisenhower indications 
that the United States was ready to accept his revised coexistence 
concept at its face value. Such encouragement was all the more 
important to him as there was opposition to the revision from the 
Chinese Communists and, apparently, from some of his colleagues 
in the Kremlin. The Chinese, in particular, charged on the very 
eve of the U-2 incident last spring that there was "no change at 
all in substance in U.S. imperialist policy, the policy carried out 
by the U.S. government and by President Eisenhower person- 
ally." 30 
At this point came the U-2 affair. It could only be interpreted 
by Khrushchev to mean that his whole new policy was being 
rejected out of hand by the United States and in a way seemingly 
almost calculated to give ammunition to his critics. 
It still seems incredible that-whether as a result of misfeasance, 
malfeasance, or nonfeasance-the May U-2 flight was permitted 
on the eve of a Summit meeting at which, presumably, we were 
going to discuss possible settlements with the Soviet Union. But 
regardless of the unfortunate timing, the ever-suspicious Russians 
were bound to read in it aggressive rather than defensive intent. 
The chief American explanation for the U-2 flights is that they 
were "necessary" to give us information for guarding against sur- 
prise attack. It is true that all kinds of intelligence can be useful 
in formulation of policy. Given the Soviet view of American 
policy, however, it is easy to see how information of the kind 
apparently sought by the U-2 would be considered primarily the 
sort needed not to prevent but to initiate a surprise attack. This 
so-called "strike first" offensive policy must be based on accurate 
knowledge of missile installations in the target country so as to 
30. The official organ of the Chinese Communist Party is quoted by Harrison 
Salisbury in "Haunting Enigma of Red China," New York Times Maga- 
zine, June 12, 1960, p. 74. 
be sure to prevent, or at least to minimize, subsequent retaliation. 
On the other hand, the proclaimed American preventive policy of 
deterrence, or "strike second," has been based less on pin-pointing 
military targets than on the ability to deliver "massive retaliation" 
in the form of a nuclear broadside that would devastate the entire 
area of the nation that had attacked us first. 
It does no good to tell the Russians that American policy does 
not contemplate any surprise attack on them. The important point 
is not that it is so but that they understand it. Their doubts about 
the sincerity of our fears of a surprise attack on us must have been 
enhanced, furthermore, by publication, almost at the very time 
the U-2 was shot down, of a U.S. Army analysis of Soviet military 
policy which found that the U.S.S.R. not only does not haue but is 
not undertaking to build the force needed to carry out a surprise 
attack on the United States.31 
Furthermore, all this took place in the context of a situation 
that Moscow had already interpreted as a hardening of U.S. 
policy. The Pentagon, the Atomic Energy Commission, and such 
high administration personages as Under Secretary of State Dillon 
had made it clear they were opposed to any compromises. Whether 
or not President Eisenhower had indicated to Khrushchev a will- 
ingness to discuss our position in Berlin, as the Summit meeting 
neared we appeared to be sharply restricting the areas on which 
we would negotiate, not only in regard to Berlin but also in regard 
to disarmament. It must be remembered, further, that there had 
also been a U-2 flight clear across the Soviet Union on April 9, 
1960. ( I t  is true that U-2 flights go back several years, but it is by 
no means clear that prior to the Spring of 1960 they were not 
simply probing flights in the border areas rather than deep into 
Soviet territory. ) In addition, the day after the U-2 was shot down, 
the U.S. House of Representatives adopted without opposition a 
resolution urging - as Congress had urged before - diplomatic 
action against the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and calling 
for 'liberation" even of parts of the U.S.S.Rea2 
31. New York Times? May 5, 1960, p. 1. 
32. New York Times, May 3, 1960, p. 1. 
However, even more important than the U-2 flight itself was 
the official American attitude toward it. One can only speculate 
as to whether Khrushchev had earlier intended to attend the 
Summit meeting in a conciliatory spirit. It is possible that, given 
what seemed to be a "firmer" American stance, he did not really 
want the meeting. But the indication that the flights would con- 
tinue and the virtual assertion of the Secretary of State, backed by 
the President, that we had a right and a duty to continue them 
were guaranteed to produce a violent e~plos ion .~~  Khrushchev's 
violence in Paris was, of course, typically Russian, which is to say 
without much finesse; although it should be remembered that he 
did give Mr. Eisenhower an opportunity to disavow personal 
responsibility for the U-2 flights:' an opportunity the President 
did not accept. In any event, the American position as initially 
set forth was clearly indefensible by any standards. 
The tragedy is, of course, that the American government really 
did not mean it, at least in the crude and extreme form in which 
the policy was enunciated right after the U-2 was shot down. This 
was indicated by the President's announcement that the U-2 flights 
had been discontinued. But by then it was too late. Moreover, it is 
not clear how much, basically, the American attitude toward the 
affair did change. Despite discontinuance of the flights, our reac- 
tion amounted more or less to one of indignation that the Russians 
were indignant. There still does not seem to be appreciation of 
the distinction between the ordinary spying in which all nations 
indulge-that is, espionage, such as that for which the Soviet 
agent, Colonel Abel, was convicted some time ago-and the 
sending of an airplane deep into the heart of a foreign country 
in an age of nuclear weapons and fears of surprise attack on 
both sides. 
On top of the U-2 came the RB-47. There is no reason to doubt 
the American explanation that the RB-47, a bomber, was actually 
outside Soviet territorial waters. But one might well question 
what an American bomber was doing even fifty miles away from 
33. New York Times, May 10, May 12, 1960, p. 1. 
34. New Ymk Times, May 8, 1960, p. 1. 
Soviet jurisdiction, and especially at that time. If we wanted to 
impress the Russians with our peaceful intentions, was this the 
way to do it, so soon after the U-2? Would the American reaction 
have been much different had a Soviet bomber appeared fifty 
miles off the Keys than it would have if it were over Florida itself? 
If all this did not mean that military and other forces that oppose 
settlements with the Soviet Union were in control of administra- 
tion policy, it at least indicated the tragic inability of President 
Eisenhower to control his administration. If there were any doubts 
about this, they should have been dispelled by the reckless order- 
ing of a world-wide alert of U.S. military forces on the very eve 
of the Summit conference. 
The Soviet Reaction 
t o  U-2 and RB-47 
The whole development produced a strong Soviet reaction and 
some reorientation and stiffening of Soviet policy. It was all very 
well to say, as did Mr. Lodge, the chief foreign policy spokesman 
for the administration during the 1960 Presidential campaign, 
that the Russians were simply using the U-2 and related incidents 
as an excuse for their new attitude. But the fact is that the U-2 
and other incidents did occur and that there was ample reason 
for Moscow to regard them as sufficiently serious for a shift of 
policy. The change was immediately evident when Khrushchev 
appeared at the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 
1960. The best explanation for Wrushchev's unorthodox conduct 
there is that he was simply asserting the Soviet place in the sun, 
and announcing-almost as a dare-a stronger stand on colonial- 
ism. His violent attack on UN-Western policy in Africa ended 
possibilities of compromise on the Congo. His demand for a troika 
East-West-Neutralist UN executive bespoke a harder attitude in 
regard to UN affairs, and this carried over later when the same 
institutional arrangement was insisted on for test ban inspection. 
- 
On the other hand, Soviet disarmament negotiators continued to 
show moderation in their proposals, and Khrushchev was re- 
strained in reiterating his demands for a German peace treaty. 
What is more important, however, is that neither then nor later 
does there seem to have been any change in the new concept of 
coexistence. There is no doubt that Chinese pressure for revision 
increased, but the Kremlin maintained its position. If anything, 
Soviet polemics about the possibility of averting war and the 
necessity of disarmament became more emphaticm3' When the 
leaders of eighty-one Communist Parties met in Moscow in No- 
vember, 1980, the statement they adopted had harsh words about 
imperialist aggressiveness, a vigorous denunciation of U.S. policy, 
and a strong reaffirmation of the struggle between communism and 
capitalism. But the statement emphatically endorsed Khrushchev's 
position on war and coexistence and declared: "The problem of 
war and peace is the most burning problem of our time.''3Vhe 
draft Program of the Soviet Communist Party prepared for the 
22nd Congress in October, 1961, was couched in the same terms. 
The possibility for agreement thus remained, but it seemed 
increasingly clear that if the impasse resulting from the 1960 
events were to be broken there had to be American initiative in 
terms of proposals not obviously unacceptable to minimum Soviet 
requirements. To say this is by no means to suggest that the 
United States should "give in" to the Russians on all or even on 
most issues. The point is that it is only realism to see that there 
are some areas where they are extremely unlikely to be moved 
just as there are some areas where we are extremely unlikely to be 
moved. The Soviet irreducible minima mentioned above are irre- 
ducible not only because of the nature of the U.S.S.R. and its 
35. See as examples discussions published during the summer of 1960, Trud, 
July 7 ,  August 30; Kommunfst, No. 10 (July), esp. p. 35; Smetskayu 
Rossiya, Aug. 17; Prauda, Aug. 12, Aug. 26, Sept. 15; and Zzvestia, Aug. 
14, Aug. 18. 
36. Text of the statement published in New York Times, Dec. 7 ,  1960, pp. 
14-17. 
policies but also because they are areas where the West cannot 
force the Russians. Were these areas vital to our security, there 
would be, of course, no point in negotiating at all. But it is by no 
means clear that this is the case. 
Areas of Negotiation 
What are possible areas of negotiation with the Russians? First 
and foremost there are those concerning thermonuclear weapons, 
both in regard to a test ban agreement and in regard to disarma- 
ment. Negotiations on these matters, which have seemed intermi- 
nable and have often been acrimonious, survived the U-2 atmos- 
phere. Both sides have at times compromised, at times stiffened 
positions. In neither of the cases has the Soviet Union taken 
intransigent positions or indicated an unwillingness to negotiate 
seriously.a7 If the United States has doubts that the U.S.S.R. really 
desires agreements, the same doubts exist in the U.S.S.R. about 
the United States. 
The fate of the test ban negotiations is illustrative. In April, 1959, 
the Russians made a major concession when they withdrew their 
earlier demand for limited on-site inspections subject to a veto 
and proposed that a quota be set for the number of such inspec- 
tions but that such inspections themselves be unrestricted and 
veto-free. While the number of inspections remained in dispute, 
leading American scientists privy to the negotiations felt there 
were no real barriers to agreement. At that time, however, the 
United States drew back, raising the question of difficulties in 
detecting underground inspections and asking that the ban not 
- 
37. For discussions of these negotiations, see Joseph Nogee, "The Diplonlacy 
of Disarmament," International Conciliation, No. 526 ( Jan. 1960), and 
"Disarmament and Foreign Policy," Hearings, Disannanlent Subcommit- 
tee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January-March, 1959, espe- 
cially testimony of Dr. Hans Bethe (February 2)  and James J. Wadsworth 
(March 25). See also Anthony Nutting, Disarmament, An Outline of 
Negotiations, London, 1959. 
apply to certain types of underground and atmospheric tests. 
Although there was no evidence to support them, American offi- 
cials began to voice suspicions that the Soviet Union was carrying 
on secret underground tests, and the Atomic Energy Commission 
called for resumption of tests by the United States.38 The new 
administration in Washington then seemed ready to compromise 
on the number of inspections. At this point, in the spring of 1961, 
it was the Soviet turn to pull back. Ambassador Tsarapkin now 
demanded a three-man secretariat comprised of representatives of 
the U.S. and Soviet blocs and the neutralists-the troika idea-and 
unanimity before inspection could be undertaken. This proposal 
was clearly unacceptable to the West. 
Any doubts that Moscow had lost interest in a test ban were 
dispelled by Khrushchev's announcement that nuclear testing 
was to be resumed in the atmosphere above Siberia. There is 
much evidence that Washington was ready to begin tests on its 
own-underground-and one commentator indicated that if the 
Russians had held off as much as a week or two, the Americans 
would have been the first to break the unofficial agreement against 
testing. This may have been a factor in the Soviet decision. In any 
event, soon after the Russians began exploding nuclear devices 
in the atmosphere, the Americans followed suit underground. 
The Soviet resumption of testing was a dangerous act, whether 
it was an irrational one or not. It subjected large areas of the earth 
to more fallout. It apparently blasted any hopes of a test ban 
agreement. And it increased international tensions. Doubtless it 
reflected the general stiffening of Soviet policy-possibly in con- 
nection with the Berlin crisis-and it may have involved pressure 
from the Chinese. But there were also military factors. Since the 
U.S.S.R. had conducted many fewer tests than the United States, 
presumably it was behind in weapon development. That the de- 
cision was taken - despite international political consequences- 
to try to catch up indicates its relation to the disarmament nego- 
tiations. Aside from the fallout question, the real significance of 
38. New York Times, July 31, 1961, p. 1. 
a test ban agreement would be as a step toward an agreement on 
control or elimination of thermonuclear weapons. The Soviet 
attitude on testing seems to indicate a belief that the United 
States is not prepared to make an agreement on disarmament. 
The disarmament negotiations have revealed deeper and more 
serious difficulties than were apparent in the test ban talks. Here, 
despite frequent official and press comment, the major problem is 
more basic than inspection. As far as inspection goes, the Soviet 
Union has proposed detailed plans for virtually unresticted, veto- 
free inspection. But they have tied it to an agreement that accepts 
the idea of complete or "total" disarmament, and on this point the 
Americans have repeatedly demurred. We have insisted on work- 
ing out an inspection system before proceeding to discuss dis- 
armament. There has not been agreement on the inspection 
mechanism either, but Khrushchev has repeatedly declared that 
if the West will accept the principle of total disarmament he, in 
turn, will accept "any kind of inspection." 39 While there may be 
valid reasons for holding back on total, across-the-board disarma- 
ment at this time, we have not agreed either to the idea of "total" 
thermonuclear disarmament in advance of details on an inspec- 
tion system. On the other hand, the Soviet position has never 
rejected partial disarmament. If the West would not accept total 
disarmament, Khrushchev has declared, "the Soviet government 
is ready to come to agreement with other states on appropriate 
partial steps of disarmament and strengthening of security." 40 
Perhaps Wrushchev does not really mean his sweeping pledge 
about accepting "any kind of inspection," but, of course, we shall 
never know if we do not take him up on it. That we have not, 
despite the advantages it might offer in terms of propaganda 
39. See New York Times, Sept. 27, 1960, p. 1; Prauda, Jan. 18 and May 10, 
1961. For statement of this position to the Geneva disarmament confer- 
ence by Soviet Delegate Tsarapkin, se2 Los Angeles Times, June 30, 1961, 
p. 1. 
40. Prauda, cited in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. X, no. 49 
( January 14, 1959 ) . 
value if nothing else, casts doubts on how seriously the United 
States really desires an agreement. These doubts cannot be com- 
pletely dispelled with ease because, given overall American policy, 
our position is ambiguous. We want agreements in principle but 
only if they can be had "without risk." Quite honestly fearing 
Soviet aggression, the major American policy-makers disagree 
with President Eisenhower's chief negotiator, James J. Wadsworth, 
who expressed his belief that "the Russian government has every 
intention of living up to any agreement they may make from the 
standpoint of nuclear tests or the larger area of disarmament." 
These officials also deny George Kennan7s point that "the best 
security we can have against violation will not be the inspection 
provisions themselves . . . but the absence of incentive to viola- 
tion."" The logic of their position, given the fact that a really 
"foolproof" inspection system is technically impossible, is that any 
disarmament agreement would jeopardize our security. Instead of 
disarmament, the American preference is for "arms control." This 
would, hopefully, minimize the risk of war and at the same time 
constitute an "enlargement of the scope of our military strategy." 
Such a concept is unacceptable to Moscow and to many others 
who feel that anything short of complete elimination of at least 
all thermonuclear weapons would not deal with the main problem. 
(This reluctance to accept disarmament as a goal may also 
reflect fear that without arms the United States cannot halt devel- 
opment of communism arising internally in backward countries. 
Such fear is both unnecessary and unbecoming to citizens of a 
country with the ideas and capabilities of the United States. The 
resulting rejection of disarmament as a goal is also irrational, 
because armament in itself cannot halt development of com- 
munism. This is true not only of thermonuclear weapons but also 
of "conventional" armament. Development of communism can be 
41. Mr. Wadsworth's opinion was quoted in the New York Times, Jan. 18, 
1961, p. 6. 
42. See Hearings, Disarmament Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 86th Congress, 1st session, Part 2, Feb. 4, 1959, pp. 205-207. 
43. Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and A m  Control, 
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961, p. 1. 
halted only by providing a better alternative. The apparent Amer- 
ican emphasis on "guerrilla" warfare is only another indication of 
our failure to grasp the reality of the social revolutionary impetus 
that grips the underdeveloped areas.) 
Nothing said here should be construed as advocating that the 
United States give up its military strength while the Russians 
keep theirs. But one does not have to advocate unilateral disarma- 
mentPeor anything like it, to see that there are any number of steps 
we could take without jeopardizing our security. Among them, 
for example, is a plan for cautious phased or graduated unilateral 
curtailment of our military posture, with very small steps taken in 
the beginning, with invitations to the Russians to follow suit, and 
with the understanding that the procedure can be halted at any 
point. Imagination and more imagination, in both word and deed, 
is what is needed to break the deadlock. Nothing can be done, 
however, until it is realized we are not in a chess game but in a 
deadly maze from which we must break out or perish. 
Furthermore, agreement on nuclear weapons is inextricably 
tied up with political settlements, and political settlements are 
unlikely without an easing of tension. Here American policy, again 
based on the assumption of Soviet military aggression, has shown 
no indication of moves toward settlement of issues making for 
conflict. It is apparent not only that we are unwilling to discuss 
disengagement in any form but also that we are proceeding with 
a policy of arming our NATO allies with nuclear weapons. It is 
not at all clear that this policy does not apply also to Western 
Germany. There is good reason to fear that the results of such a 
policy, regardless of its aims, could make any real agreement on 
either disengagement or disarmament practically impossible, Fur- 
thermore, apparently, there seems to be no thinking about the 
future of our bases which more or less encircle the Soviet Union. 
There are, after all, only two ways to settle international conflicts- 
force and mutual compromise. While the United States does not 
want to use force, it is not always clear that it wants to consider 
mutual compromise. 
There is, indeed, grave reason to believe that the American 
position on these matters is unrealistic, inflexible, and unimagina- 
tive. Basically, our position throughout continues to be conditioned 
by our assumption of the constant danger of Soviet military ag- 
gression. Sometimes this is modified by defining Soviet policy as 
being committed to use ''all possible means" for the expansion of 
communism and extension of its power.** As indicated above, this 
thinking is based on distorted evidence or no evidence at all and 
ignores the strong reasons for considering that the Soviet theory 
of coexistence is predicated not on making war but on avoiding it. 
Furthermore, the concept of agreements totally without risk has 
no validity. As George Kennan put it, ". . . cultivation of the ideal 
military posture will always be in conflict with any serious effort 
to ease international political tensions." And a policy "not prepared 
to make sacrifices and to accept risks in the military field should 
not lay claim to any serious desire to see world problems settled 
by any means short of war." 45 The risks, in any cas,e, are compara- 
tive, and the implication of American policy is that we are in 
greater danger from Soviet aggression than from a continuation of 
the thermonuclear arms race. Unfortunately, the evidence is to 
the contrary. 
The Impasse of Berlin 
Berlin is a good example of the difficulties that arise both from 
past American policies and from our refusal to think in terms of 
possible compromise on points of dispute between us and the 
Russians. We are perfectly right in refusing to be "pushed out" of 
Berlin. Having made commitments-loudly and of ten-to the West 
Berliners, ow concern to "save them from communism" is under- 
44. As an example, see the generally moderate study prepared by a Columbia- 
Harvard research group for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
United States Foreign Policy: U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, 86th Con- 
gress, 2nd session, No. 11 (February 14, 1960). 
45. George F. Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited," Fareign Aflairs, Vol. 
XXXVIII, no. 3 (April, 1959), p. 199. 
standable. But it is no policy at all simply to reiterate that we will 
%tand firm," and it is only sophistry to assert that since the United 
States is demanding no change in the status of Berlin the issue 
arises only because of Soviet aggression and trouble-making. The 
situation in Berlin is abnormal and im~ermanent .~~  It is nonsense 
to talk about the Berlin situation as a part of a status quo that 
must be maintained. One does not have to agree with Soviet pro- 
posals to see that the Russian concern over the presence of foreign 
troops stationed far inside one of their satellite states which the 
West refuses to recognize is entirely natural. Furthermore, our 
position in Berlin is highly untenable militarily, diplomatically, 
and legally. Under these conditions the long-continued failure 
of the West even to discuss possible compromises on the Berlin 
issue was irresponsible. 
To see the Berlin question in some perspective, it is necessary 
to consider several factors in connection with the whole question 
of Germany. First, the raison $&re for our presence in Berlin has 
changed not only once but twice. Originally, Berlin, although 
more than a hundred miles inside the Soviet zone, was set apart 
on the grounds that it would be again the capital of a unified 
Germany. Then disputes over quadripartite administration led to 
a more formal and legal division of Germany. Certainly responsi- 
bility for this dispute must be shared by both the United States 
and the Soviet Union. If there was ever any agreement that was 
mutually violated, it was the Potsdam agreement on Germany. 
We felt we were reacting to Soviet policy, but it was, after all, the 
United States that took the initiative in formalizing the split when 
we presided over the combination of the Western zones and then 
established them as a West German state. The Soviet Union, in 
establishing an East German state, was merely following suit. 
Subsequent American policy has emphasized what Secretary 
of State Rusk, in the summer of 1961, called the "many contradic- 
tions and historical fallacies in the present position of the Soviet 
46. Both the U.S. and West German governments obviously so regard it, the 
latter despite its insistence that no negotiated compromise is possible. 
See positions quoted by Walter Lippmann, "What's Not Said about Berlin," 
Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1961, section C, p. 5. 
leaders," 47 but has ignored the contradictions and historical falla- 
cies in our own position. The Western assumption that we had a 
right to create "our" German state but that the Soviet Union did 
not have a right to create "theirs" is so untenable that we do not 
even assert it in this manner, let alone try to justify it. Furthermore, 
this division of Germany completely altered if it did not destroy 
the practical as well as the legal basis for Berlin's separate status 
and for Western presence there. 
Under the conditions of two German states, maintenance of the 
Western position in Berlin became a maneuver in a diplomatic 
gambit ostensibly aimed at negotiating reunification. At the very 
least, ensuing American policies were just as responsible as Soviet 
policies for the fact that there never were real negotiations on 
reunification. One can agree even with the American decisions to 
rearm West Germany and to insist that a reunified Germany be 
included in NATO and still see the logic of the Soviet refusal to 
agree. East Germany, although tightly under the Soviet thumb 
from the beginning, was not a full Soviet satellite-in the sense of 
the Eastern European countries-until sometime after the mid- 
1950's. Before that time, whether in anticipation of an acceptable 
reunification or not, the Russians had not insisted on a complete 
socialization of East Germany in terms of thoroughgoing national- 
ization, collectivization, etc. By 1958, however, it seemed clear 
that any likelihood of reunification had disappeared. East Ger- 
many had become as fully integrated into the Soviet Bloc as West 
Germany had become integrated into the Western Bloc. We do 
not know whether the Russians were ever really interested in 
reunification, but it is extremely doubtful if American policy was, 
especially after the creation of NATO. In addition, there was 
another factor : West Germany itself. Rearmed and economically 
powerful, the West Germans made it clear in 1958 that they would 
not permit reunification on the only condition that reunification 
was then possible-military disengagement in Central Europe, 
compromises between East and West German systems, and definite 
exclusion from both blocs. 
47. See text of Secretary Rusk$ statement, New York Times, June 23, 1961, 
p. 2. 
With reunification no longer possible, the rationale of our pres- 
ence in Berlin clearly could no longer be that it was a maneuver 
concerned with reunification. It was at this point that the Russians 
began to press their proposals for a change in the Berlin situation. 
This Soviet decision must also be considered in connection with 
other factors. The Western powers refused to recognize the East 
German republic as well as the Oder-Neisse frontier with Poland. 
The West German republic, its rearmament growing apace with 
its economic development, likewise refuses to accept the Oder- 
Neisse line and has been ostentatiously asserting a claim to West 
Berlin. 
While it is doubtless true that the comparative well-being of 
West Berlin constitutes an embarrassment to the Communists, this 
alone does not explain the Soviet eagerness for a change. And in 
addition to everything else, there is the stake of the East German 
Communist leaders themselves. Despite their undoubted sub- 
servience to Moscow, now that they have a full-fledged state to 
run they have a personal stake in the matter of Berlin in the same 
way that leaders of other Communist countries have a personal 
stake in developments within their own boundaries. 
Given this situation, the Berlin impasse is a source of instability 
-and therefore of danger-for the whole of Central Europe. There 
is, therefore, nothing unnatural about the Russians' view that such 
instability is a danger to their whole position generally. Khrush- 
chev has not made pre-emptory demands. For at least three years 
he has continually advised the Western powers of the interest the 
Soviet Union attaches to such a change and has agreed to nego- 
tiate on counter-proposals. 
The status quo in Berlin is by no means vital to our interests. 
That it cannot be preserved in any event was illustrated by the 
comparative ease with which it was altered when the Russians 
and the East Germans more or less walled off East Berlin. Unless 
we are prepared to risk war in a vain attempt to preserve some- 
thing which does not exist and where no vital U.S. interest is in- 
volved, some compromise is essential. Several possibilities sug- 
gest themselves. Demilitarization with the present division is one. 
Joint East-West German condominium is another. United Nations 
supervision is a third, and there are others. Even Senator Mans- 
field's unlikely suggestion of a "free city" guaranteed by both the 
Soviet Union and the United States is at least a proposal. Nor has 
the question of whether a new Berlin set-up would involve both 
East and West Berlin or only West Berlin been ruled out as 
something for negotiation. 
Given the unlikelihood of reunification, the hard, cold realities 
of international politics point to Berlin's ultimately becoming the 
capital of the country in which it is located-East Germany-but 
we are not being asked to consider that. Compromises are open to 
us. To consider them is not appeasement. "To search for an alterna- 
tive by which war could be averted, without sacrificing the honor 
or the treaty obligations of the United States," wrote Arthur Krock, 
apropos of Berlin, "is the high duty of statesman~hip."~~ In one 
sense, what Khrushchev has been doing is pointing out that the 
U.S.S.R. considers its interests jeopardized by the present arrange- 
ment and inviting us to join in a search for an alternative. It may 
be that we cannot find one. But the question of Berlin is in many 
ways like that of German reunification earlier. We shall never 
know whether the Russians would accept some compromise 
acceptable to us until we agree to discuss one. 
U. S. Bases and Eastern Europe 
In considering possibilities for settling the sorest points at issue 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the general inter- 
national political climate must be considered. This climate is 
significantly affected by two highly important factors: the con- 
stantly recurring matter of Eastern Europe and the question of 
American bases around the Soviet Union. 
48. Arthur Krock, "Mqnsfield Wrongly Called an Appeaser," Los Angeles 
Times, June 27, 1961, part 3, p. 5. 
Although American policy no longer is couched in wild and 
irresponsible terms like "liberation," it continues to emphasize 
the desirability of interfering in Eastern Europe one way or 
another, apparently oblivious of the impact this sort of challenge 
has on the Kremlin. This American attitude of non-acceptance of 
these Communist regimes has virtually no effect on the course of 
affairs in Eastern Europe. If there is any way at all that the Soviet 
hegemony can be weakened, it is through a lessening of inter- 
national tension. There is no doubt, for instance, that American 
policy toward Germany and the Oder-Neisse Line is an important 
factor motivating many Poles and Czechs toward accepting strong 
Soviet influence. 
It is entirely understandable that many if not most Americans 
view the satellite regimes with disapproval. It is less understand- 
able that so many Americans have been led to believe that constant 
official expressions of opposition, which in no way eases the plight 
of the Eastern European people and if anything makes life harder 
for them, serve any good purpose. Can there be justification for a 
course which accomplishes nothing but the opposite of its inten- 
tion and, at the same time, interferes with efforts to lessen the 
dangers of a nuclear holocaust? Yet this is exactly the impact of 
American policy toward Eastern Europe. This policy may be 
largely hortatory, but it is still one of the most significant factors 
creating dissension between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. It must be reevaluated, not in terms of cheap and dis- 
honest pandering for political support from Polish-American and 
similar groups but in terms of the realities of the situation and the 
interest of the United Statesn4@ 
The impact of American bases around the Soviet Union is seldom 
discussed in the United States. Convinced of our own devotion to 
49. American antics about Eastern Europe are sometimes not only provocative 
but also ridiculous. The "Captive Nations Resolution" that passed Con- 
gress in 1959 refers not only to the Eastern European countries and to 
certain ethnic-national divisions of the U.S.S.R. itself but also to two 
"nations" that never existed in any form-"Cossackia" and "Idel-Ural." 
See articles in New York anti-Soviet Russian newspaper, Novoye Russkoye 
Slouo, b y  Gregory Tschebotarioff, June 8 and 17, 1960, and editorial in 
The Nation, April 23, 1960. 
peace, we have been unable, apparently, to see how provocative 
these bases are in Moscow's eyes, even when they have been 
utilized for such activities as U-2 flights. Even if one assumes that 
the bases once served some purpose, it is necessary to ask whether 
they still do today in view of the capabilities of Soviet nuclear 
weaponry and rocketry. To what extent does their existence inter- 
fere with agreements that might reduce the dangers of the very 
war againstwhich the bases are supposed to guard? Can the bases 
be maintained forever? And if not forever, how is eventual with- 
drawal envisaged, and when? Is it possible that a powerful nation 
like the Soviet Union, no longer second in military strength, will 
indefinitely permit itself to be encircled in this way? Is it realistic 
to assume that Soviet reactions to an American militaxy posture in, 
say, Iran are any different from what ours would be to a Soviet 
base in Cuba? 
Our idea, of course, has been to "contain" the Soviet Union. 
The bases were established in a period when the U.S.S.R. was in 
a markedly inferior position militarily. Today, is not the Soviet 
Union likely to be encouraged to try some "containing" of its own? 
Is there any reason why two cannot play at the game? The tides 
of international politics are never certain. Who knows who may 
end up "containing" whom? All these are questions to which 
American policy must address itself if it is to seek realistically to 
avoid war and serve the interest of the United States. 
But what is the interest of the United States? Most of this dis- 
cussion has implied some compromise in present American posi- 
tions. The implication is, obviously, that the United States is too 
inflexible in some areas and over-committed in others. There is, 
of course, no thought of "giving in" to the Russians on any issue 
involving vital American security interests, American core inter- 
ests. The point is, rather, whether American core interests should 
not be more carefully defined. Can the United States, any more 
than any other nation, have interests of equal significance to its 
security all over the globe? To suggest that certain interests are 
primary to us and that certain interests of less import to us are 
primary to other nations, and to negotiate compromises regarding 
these latter areas, in no sense constitutes "appeasement" (a  word 
that has been so misused as to connote almost any compromise 
with Moscow). It is only common sense to see that an assertion 
of global core interests, regardless of the high ideals that may 
motivate it, can only bring conflict because of inevitable collision 
with core interests of other nations. At best, it will encourage 
globalization of other nations' interests. The United States has 
military bases in many areas immediately bordering the Soviet 
Union. Our position has been that these are necessary for our 
security. But do not such attempts to achieve "total security" 
inevitably mean the "total insecurity" of other countries? Does the 
United States really have a greater security stake in areas immedi- 
ately bordering the Soviet Union than does the Soviet Union itself? 
It is true that for the United States to withdraw its military 
bases from some of these areas might result in exposing them over 
the long run to Soviet influence and even Soviet domination, 
although there is no basis for assuming that withdrawal of Ameri- 
can forces in various areas near the Soviet Union would mean that 
the Russians would necessarily "move in" physically. On the other 
hand, our reliance on a military posture in many countries tends 
to interfere with the very domestic political and economic reforms 
-and our acceptance of them-that constitute the basic prerequi- 
site for preventing Communist success. (The defense of such a 
policy is often raised in moral terms, in terms of our "duty" to 
defend democratic values from Communist encroachment. Alas, 
the democratic values in some nations with which we are thus 
allied exist only in the eyes of American self-interest. However, 
the real objection to our support of many regimes is not that they 
are undemocratic but that they are untenable.) 
It is often asked, "Suppose we do restrict our global interests? 
Suppose, for example, we do give up some bases and stop heckling 
the Russians about Eastern Europe? What do we get in return?" 
We have become so used to the idea that we have a right to global 
interests, while the Russians don't, that this is, for many Americans, 
a natural question. It is important to realize that we cannot expect 
the Soviet Union to "give up" anything simply because we cease 
maintaining a position that threatens Soviet vital interests. In order 
to imagine how the Russians feel about this, we must think how 
we would feel if the Soviet Union had military bases in British 
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Quebec, Ontario, and the West 
Indies, while we had no bases at all around the Soviet Union. 
Would this produce an atmosphere conducive to trust and to con- 
sideration of mutual compromises? Or, assume that we did not 
have military bases around the Soviet Union-which we do-and 
assume that the Soviet Union did have a military base in Cuba- 
which it does not. What would we give up as a quid pro quo for 
the Russians withdrawing their base from Cuba? Even under the 
existing base situation, the comparatively moderate interest the 
U.S.S.R. has expressed in the Castro regime has caused indigna- 
tion and concern in the United States. 
The suggestion that we might consider abandoning some bases 
is made, of course, in the interest of the United States, not the 
Soviet Union. But in achieving a more rational American foreign 
policy, better able to serve our own interest, we would also con- 
tribute to an international situation in which meaningful agree- 
ments would be more rather than less likely, because then the 
possibility for mutual compromises would present itself. It is not 
proposed, for example, that the United States unilaterally with- 
draw its forces from Central or Western Europe. But mutual dis- 
engagement, in a situation where American bases no longer ringed 
Soviet borders, would be a true subject for negotiation. Making it 
clear that we would recognize Soviet interests in areas around the 
Soviet periphery, also, would be an earnest for seeking assurances 
from the U.S.S.R. of hands off Cuba and all Latin Arne r i~a .~~  
Of course, we cannot be certain that adequate compromises 
would be forthcoming from the Russians, although there is no 
reason to assume they would not be, since there is no reason to 
assume they are not serious about their fear of nuclear war and 
their desire to minimize the danger of it. But because the United 
States, by concentrating its efforts, would be in a stronger rather 
than a weaker position, we would be the gainer in any event. 
50. Cuba is in some ways a sort of Latin American Yugoslavia. Once a new 
reorientation was established, we assisted the Yugoslavs and the Soviet 
Union assisted the Cubans, although the Russians have not yet set up a 
military mission in Cuba as we did in Yugoslavia. 
American Psychology 
of Non -Acceptance 
With our own ideological commitment against communism, such 
reconsideration of our policy seems unpalatable to many. And yet 
the realities of international politics are full of unpalatable choices. 
We accept them, for instance, in our recognition of the necessity of 
doing business with Franco Spain and in recognizing French 
interest in Algeria, but we do not accept them in connection with 
the Soviet Union, where our own security, to say nothing of the 
security of the whole world, is infinitely more involved. Why? 
One reason, it is submitted, is that the United States has never 
really come psychologically to acceptance of the Soviet Union as 
a force with which we must deal on a basis of permanence and 
equality. Thus, for example, we were unable to accept the real 
lesson of the Sputniki, which was not that America was weak, but 
that the Soviet Union was strong. This psychology of non-accept- 
ance grew out of fear, ignorance, and emotion. It is fraught with 
the most deadly danger. (Almost monotonously, we seem to be 
repeating the same pattern in regard to China. Of course the 
trouble is not just the U.S.S.R. or just China; it is also communism 
as such. ) 
Only a psychological situation in which we did not really accept 
the reality of the U.S.S.R. can explain our inability to realize that 
we cannot undertake or threaten action Moscow considers pro- 
vocative without there being a Soviet reaction. For example, 
Khrushchev has frequently warned that countries where the 
United States was establishing atomic rocket launching sites would 
be destroyed if war were begun against the Soviet Union. He has 
also warned countries from which American planes took off to fly 
over Soviet territory that they were participating in provocative 
action. The U.S. State Department has listed some of these under 
the title of "Soviet Threats of Destruction Against the Free 
World." 51 
It is the psychology of non-acceptance that also inhibits our 
ability to compromise and leads to the idea that we can "win" the 
cold war. What does it mean, "win" the cold war? That the Soviet 
Union will fade away? That communism will disappear? These 
are not realistic possibilities. On the contrary, it is altogether 
likely that the area committed to communism of some sort will 
expand here and there. This is neither unnatural nor fatal. The 
West certainly does not have to "lose" the cold war, and if we 
base our policies on realism we will not lose it. But we can no 
more "win" it than can the Soviet Union. This does not mean that 
the cold war can be finally resolved by agreement, if by cold war 
is meant competition between the two systems. This competition 
will go on indefinitely, pushed by the Communists and also by us, 
and we must be constantly alert to the great challenge it presents. 
But the danger in remarks about "winning the cold war is pre- 
cisely that they imply the possibility of a cessation of the competi- 
tion on the part of the Communists and, therefore, tend to reject 
any compromise. Consider, for example, the statement of General 
Nathan F. Twining, made just before he retired as chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in the fall of 1960. Asserting our ability to 
destroy both the Soviet Union and China if we are attacked, 
General Twining said, according to the Associated Press, that the 
cold war will go on until there is a clear winner and a clear loser. 
And he added: "The struggle is too big, too vast, too deadly for 
51. Smiet Aflaiss Notes, No. 242 (June 10, 1960), pp. 1-14. The closest the 
Russians have come to "initiating threats" was Khrushchev's statement 
that "figuratively speaking" the U.S.S.R. could support the Castro regime 
with rocket fire if the United States intervened. New York Times, July 10, 
1960. Soon after, however, he backed away from any implication of 
contemplated action. Prauda, June 23, 1961. 
52. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 29,1960, p. 1. 
Courses Other Than Compromise 
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson has termed the idea that 
there is no altemative to negotiations "silly." Since, he insists, the 
Russians will negotiate "only on their own terms, then there is no 
altemative to surrender." The alternative he suggests is "action," 
which he holds, "is often the best form of negotiation." Mr. Acheson 
holds forth in this vein in a magazine article,=' but he offers no 
more real proposals for negotiation-or action-than were forth- 
coming while he was Secretary of State. 
There are courses other than negotiating compromises with the 
Soviet Union, however. The trouble is they are all unacceptable. 
In other days, war itself would have been the alternative, since we 
might, at least, have won it. But today, when war can only be lost 
by both sides, and civilization-ours for sure and likely others, too- 
destroyed in the bargain, it is no longer an acceptable alternative, 
even though it is the one we may get if we are not careful. (The 
polemics about what constitutes "survival"-such as those in which 
Herman Kahn, for instance, engagess4-hardly rise to the dignity 
of discussion. Even given Mr. Kahn's neo-logic, and given his 
neo-morality, it is entirely beside the point whether a thermo- 
nuclear war would cost 30 million or 100 million American lives 
or whether the survivors could in fact survive. The implication 
that the American political and economic system could survive 
such a war is a denigration of common sense and a grisly per- 
version of reason. ) 
Another possible course might be, theoretically, for one side or 
the other to achieve such demonstrable military superiority that 
the inferior side would give in. Today one still hears talk in high 
places that the United States must be "first." The fact is, however, 
that there is no longer any assurance whatsoever that the United 
53. "Of Men I Have Known: The Russians," Saturday Evening Post, March 
25, 1961, p. 31, pp. 69-71. 
54. See Mr. Kahn's book, On Thennonuclear War, Princeton, 1961, for 
examples. 
States can have demonstrable superiority over the Russians for 
any period of time. There is no reason to believe that we cannot 
hold o w  own, but there is no reason to believe that the Russians 
cannot hold their own, too. I t  is sometimes argued that we must 
negotiate with the Soviet Union but only after we acquire still 
more military strength. Ignoring the fact that those who make this 
suggestion are often the same people who earlier felt we did not 
have to negotiate because we did have greater military strength, 
we should ask ourselves this: What would be our reaction if this 
were the Soviet position? Would we, or would we not, be more 
willing to negotiate with Moscow if the U.S.S.R. had still greater 
military strength? Negotiations aside, even demonstrable superior- 
ity is no real safeguard, for the capacity to destroy a nation once 
is really the equivalent of the capacity to destroy it fifty times. 
This leaves a third possible course: a permanent balance of 
strength resulting in a perpetual impasse. Even if puny, finite man 
dared talk in terms of permanent and perpetual, this, too, is 
unacceptable. Not only would there be a constant struggle for the 
impossible superiority-with what dangers from fallout one can 
only speculate in horror-but, human frailty being what it is, the 
eventual occurrence of "incidents" and "accidents" would be cer- 
tain. And when membership in the "nuclear c l u b  grows-as it is 
already growing-even the apparent logic of mutual deterrence 
vanishes. The real danger of a thermonuclear holocaust does not 
involve intentions of governments or statesmen or soldiers as much 
as it involves accident. Given the continued existence of thenno- 
nuclear arms, and given simply that man and his creations, both 
mechanical and institutional, remain now, as they always have 
been, incapable of perfection, sooner or later, with a deadly 
mathematical certainty, the explosion will occur. 
That is to say, the "balance and impasse" alternative not only 
involves a risk of thennonuclear war too enormous to take, since 
war is a completely unacceptable alternative in itself, but it is 
bound to lead to war."' 
55. On this point, see Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton, 
1959, esp. pp. 351-352. 
Yet, barring a calculated war and barring clear superiority on 
either side, it is this "balance and impasse" alternative that we are 
asking for by not considering compromises with the Soviet Union. 
It is, indeed, what we have now. It is the great and overriding task 
of American statesmanship to get us-and all mankind-out of it. 
There is still time for decision, but who knows how long it will 
be available? 
It would appear that a logical American policy, therefore, should 
be based on these concepts: 
1) Survival depends, if not on disarmament, at least on arma- 
ment control agreements. 
2) Armament control agreements depend on reduction of inter- 
national tensions. 
3) Reduction of international tensions depends on agreements 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
4) Agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union 
depend on mutual compromises. 
There is no reason to believe that, given a realistic readjustment 
of our policy toward the Soviet Union, agreements cannot be 
reached. In any event, there is no alternative to trying. 
None of this is to imply that the thermonuclear war is the only 
danger we face; it is merely the most overriding one. As indicated 
above, the continuing encroachment of communism also poses a 
serious danger, although it is different and not as immediate. But 
the central idea of this essay is that the way to cope with the one 
is also the way to cope with the other. For until we reexamine our 
assumption about Soviet military aggression, we can think neither 
in terms of armament agreements and reduction of tensions nor in 
terms of dealing meaningfully with the problem of the under- 
developed areas, which is where the main danger of Communist 
inroads lies. What is needed first of all, consequently, is a new 
approach to American-Soviet relations. 
Leadership, Public Opinion, 
and the Zeitgeist 
It must be recognized that a new approach to American-Soviet 
relations is limited by domestic political realities. The American 
people have been misled to a point where public opinion consti- 
tutes a real barrier to the kind of compromises that are so vitally 
necessary. We are not stupid, but we are prisoners of our Zeitgeist, 
of the atmosphere of the times in which our society is immersed. 
There has been inadequate study of the social forces at work in the 
mass societies of the modem world, but it is clear that emotion 
and illogic and illusion are capable of creating an iron mould not 
easily broken through. This is true not only of America. To men- 
tion only one other instance, in recent times, we might do well to 
consider the case of the French in connection with Indochina. 
The French-seeing that their war could not be won, seeing that 
it was costing them far more than it would be worth even if they 
could win it-were still unable first to negotiate and then to with- 
draw until the disaster of Dien Bien Phu overtook them. This is 
cited in no criticism of France or of the French but only as an 
illustration of the rigidity that binds modem mass societies and 
makes it difficult for them to reexamine positions once taken and 
act on the logic of the reexamination. 
In our case the stakes are infinitely higher than Dien Bien Phu 
or Indochina. Yet we are bound as rigidly by our Zeitgeist into a 
mould that thus far we have been unable to break. What is in- 
volved primarily in our situation is a misunderstanding of the 
nature of the threat of the Soviet Union and communism. This 
idea about the danger of Soviet military aggression is deep in 
public opinion and official opinion. It is fed by public statements, 
newspaper and magazine articles and editorials, radio and tele- 
vision broadcasts, and even novels, the theatre, and comic strips. 
It is in the very air we breathe. It has thus far prevented a real 
reconsideration of the basis of our foreign policy. 
We would be less than frank in thinking that economic factors 
do not also play an important part in this rigidity. It is easy for a 
college professor, for example, to advocate disarmament. But it 
is not at all easy for one whose day-to-day livelihood comes from 
making armaments, even if he sees, in the abstract, the advisability 
of it. Before there can be a meaningful breakthrough toward even 
arms control, there must be a federal agency with the authority and 
the means to guarantee that no worker, no businessman, and even 
no investor suffer as a result of armament agreements. 
To make even a beginning requires executive leadership of the 
highest order, for foreign policy depends on executive leadership, 
and the inflexibility that executive leadership has wrought - 
whether by exercise or by default-can only be corrected by execu- 
tive leadership. This will take time. But even more than time, it will 
require wisdom and courage. For if public opinion cannot be 
moved without leadership, leadership often sees itself bound by 
public opinion. And, of course, a leader without followers is no 
leader at all. Yet, given the will, wise and courageous leadership 
could do a number of things almost at once without risking a 
head-on collision with public rigidity. 
Such leadership could, for instance, begin honestly to acquaint 
the American people with the great danger they face in the present 
nuclear impasse, 
Such leadership could undertake cautiously to convince the 
American people that the Soviet Union is not necessarily militarily 
aggressive; that compromises are both possible and necessary; 
that while the cold war does not have to be "lost" neither can it 
be "won." 
Such leadership could accept openly and honestly the goal of 
complete thermonuclear disarmament and devote all efforts to 
creating an international climate that would make agreement on 
it more, rather than less, likely. 
Such leadership could explain to the American people that the 
real danger from communism lies in an unrealistic approach to 
social revolution in underdeveloped countries and that it cannot be 
combated by military force, but only by a new attitude toward 
revolutionary regimes. 
Such leadership could begin to show the American people the 
futility and disadvantage of constant challenge to the Soviet Union 
on Eastern Europe. 
Such leadership could insist on caution in public statements 
and insure that they be neither misleading, inflammatory, nor 
provocati~e.~~ 
Such leadership could initiate at private, official levels detailed 
confidential proposals for compromises on Berlin, disengagement 
of military forces, and curtailment of American bases abroad so 
as to stimulate official thinking along these lines and have plans 
ready for possible use. 
Such leadership could initiate plans for easing the economic 
problems that curtailment of arms production might bring to 
many individuals and firms and thus diminish the built-in psycho- 
logical barrier to disarmament that exists in the United States. 
Such leadership could begin to persuade the American people 
that a disarmament agreement would not be really meaningful 
unless it included all major powers, including Communist China. 
It goes without saying that all such steps would be of little avail 
unless at the same time we see to it that our own system works at 
home-economically, politically, and socially. For if we can both 
survive and also insure that the great American ideals of peace and 
freedom and equality and well-being shine once more like a beacon 
through all the world, then indeed will communism have to look 
to its laurels. 
October 1961 
56. There is indication that President Kennedy has attempted this, at least in 
regard to military personnel. 
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